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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the labor market effects of state health insurance mandates that increase the 
cost of employing a demographically identifiable group.  State mandates requiring that health 
insurance plans cover infertility treatment raise the relative cost of insuring older women of 
child-bearing age.  Empirically, wages in this group are unaffected, but their total labor input 
decreases.  Workers do not value infertility mandates at cost, and so will not take wage cuts in 
exchange, leading employers to decrease their demand for this affected and identifiable group.  
Differences in the empirical effects of mandates found in the literature are explained by a model 
including variations in the elasticity of demand, moral hazard, ability to identify a group, and 
adverse selection. 
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I  Introduction 
Health insurance mandates require that insurance companies provide coverage for 
specific services or provider types when they offer insurance to companies.  Over the past 30 
years, the number of these mandates has greatly increased, from very few mandates in 1965 to 
almost 2000 mandates in 2008 (Gruber, 1994; Bunce & Wieske, 2008).  At the same time, health 
care costs are rising at a rate much greater than inflation; for example, the Kaiser Family 
Foundation finds that insurance costs increased 131 percent between 1999 and 2009.  The 
proliferation of health insurance mandates is commonly suggested as a partial cause for this 
increase (Litow, 2002).  In addition to the direct costs to health care, inefficient mandates can 
have indirect costs through decreasing employment for groups that are unwilling or unable to 
decrease their wages by the amount of their increased insurance costs.  
Academic literature reports mixed effects of these mandates on premium cost and labor 
market outcomes for the affected workers (e.g. Monheit & Rizzo, 2007; Kowalski, Congdon, & 
Showalter., 2008; La Pierre et al., 2009; Kapur et al., 2008; Baicker & Chandra, 2006; Kaestner 
& Simon, 2002).  This paper argues that these mixed empirical results are predicted by theory, 
and provides an empirical example using the incidence of infertility mandates.  The bottom line 
is that when workers value mandates at cost, they will be willing to take a pay cut to offset the 
cost of the mandates.  When they do not fully value these mandates, and employers can 
discriminate between high cost and low cost groups, then employment of the high cost group will 
be negatively affected. 
Mandates should primarily affect labor market outcomes through the experience-rated 
effect on premium costs, as these costs make an individual worker more expensive to the firm.  
In his seminal paper on maternity mandates, Gruber (1994) shows that when firms that offer 
insurance are required to offer maternity insurance, women’s wages shift to compensate for the 
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value of the additional benefit and their probability of employment does not change.  In this 
situation, women in age groups likely to be affected by the mandate value the additional 
coverage at least at cost, effectively mitigating the increase in premium costs for these workers to 
the firm. 
However, subsequent papers looking at more general classes of these mandates have 
found mixed results of the effects of health insurance mandates on both premiums and labor 
market outcomes.  Monheit and Rizzo (2007) provide an extensive literature review of the 
impact of health insurance mandates on premiums.  A large subset of these studies group health 
insurance mandates together and compare the outcomes of states with more or fewer mandates 
over time.  In general, the effects of grouped mandates on premiums are mixed, with studies 
finding a decrease in premiums for HMOs, no effect, or finding an increase of 5 percent, 
depending on assumptions made and populations studied.  In later work, Kowalski, Congdon and 
Showalter (2008) find that the number of mandates in a state increases premium costs in non-
group markets by 0.4 to 0.9 percent.  However, La Pierre, Conover, Henderson, Seward, and 
Taylor (2009) find that the overall number of mandates does not have a statistically significant 
impact on premiums.  They also find mixed results of the effect on premiums by mandate type 
and health plan.  Focusing on “expensive” mandates and adjusting for the probability that the 
mandated item would be included on insurance plans in the absence of the mandate, the CBO 
(2000) suggests that these mandates increase premiums up to 1.15 percent. 
In terms of labor market outcomes, Kaestner and Simon (2002) find no overall effect, 
looking at all state mandates or at only expensive mandates.  In contrast to the decrease in wages 
found by Gruber (1994) in the case of maternity mandates, they find no wage tradeoff.  Cseh 
(2008) also finds no effect of mental health parity mandates on probability of receiving health 
insurance, employer contributions to insurance, labor market composition, or lower wages.  
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More generally, increased worker health costs have been shown to shift both labor supply and 
wages.  Baicker and Chandra (2006) use increases in medical malpractice costs as a source of 
variation in costs and estimate that a 10 percent increase in premiums decreases hours worked by 
2.4 percent and increases probability of being part-time by 1.2 percentage points.  Kapur, 
Escarce, Marquis, and Simon (2008) find that high expected cost workers are less likely to be 
employed or hired by small firms.  In terms of wages, Baicker and Chandra (2006) estimate that 
a 10 percent increase in premiums decreases wages by 2.3 percent while Daneshvary and 
Clauretie (2007) estimate that workers accept 16.5 percent to 20 percent lower earnings in return 
for insurance.  Similarly, Adams (2007) finds that wages for more expensive-to-insure older 
workers increase when community rating, which lowers the relative costs for these workers, is 
enacted in New York.  Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009) find that obese workers with health 
insurance accept lower wages while those without health insurance do not.  Currie and Madrian 
(1999) summarize some earlier findings on shifting health insurance costs to wages. 
As Kaestner and Simon (2002) note, a “consensus has not been reached” regarding the 
efficiency of state health insurance mandates.  However, a priori, there is no reason to assume 
that all mandates have the same effects on employment outcomes.  The case of maternity 
mandates is a special case in which a group-specific mandate is valued at least at cost to the 
worker.  Like the case of workers compensation (Gruber & Krueger, 1991; Fishback & Kantor, 
1995), this mandate is efficient because it fixes a market failure caused by adverse selection, but 
does not create large moral hazard incentives.  All parties are better off when firms are forced to 
provide this benefit.  Mandates with different attributes should, theoretically, have different or no 
effects on employment and premium costs. 
Infertility mandates provide a natural experiment similar to those of maternity mandates.  
They are theoretically similar to maternity mandates in every way except that their more elastic 
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demand creates a moral hazard problem that keeps workers from valuing the increased coverage 
at full cost.1  Therefore, theory predicts that wage shifts will not fully offset the increased costs 
of workers.  To test this general theory, this paper uses the March monthly Current Population 
Survey (CPS) in a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy to compare those in 
groups most likely to be affected by the mandate in states with infertility mandates before and 
after the mandate, to those unlikely to be affected by infertility mandates. 
This paper finds that on average, conditional on employment, wages do not adjust 
significantly and the magnitudes of adjustment are small for affected groups upon the receipt of 
infertility mandates, although the significance of these results vary subject to specification.  
However, in accordance with theory, employment for these workers decreases by around 1.07 
weeks per year, suggesting that women in affected age groups are unwilling to fully offset the 
increase in benefits through their wages. They are also about two percentage points more likely 
to be not in the labor force, though these results are only marginally significant in some 
regressions.  Wages are largely unchanged.  These results are robust to the inclusion of 
age*state*year fixed effects, sensitivity testing on the treatment group and on the universe 
studied.  The decrease in labor supply does not appear to be the effect of maternity leave after 
having had children, as childless women appear to show even stronger effects on not working 
than do all women.  These results represent the effect of these laws on the labor market for all 
women in these age groups and suggest that infertility mandates are inefficient. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II presents some background on health insurance 
benefits for infertility from the 1980s to today and discusses the economics of a group-specific 
                                                 
1 See section II.B. for information on demand elasticity.  Fewer women in the affected group will 
also utilize infertility benefits compared to maternity benefits, but the theoretical implications of 
that difference may be mitigated by differences in cost of services and beliefs about infertility 
risk or utility from the use of services. 
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mandated benefit.  Section III outlines a general theory of how infertility and other group-
specific mandates may affect the labor supply for these workers based on their different 
characteristics.  After describing the data and my estimation strategy in Section IV, I estimate the 
impact of the state mandates on the labor-market outcomes of older women of childbearing age 
(and their husbands) in Section V.  Section VI provides robustness checks and alternate 
explanations for these findings.  Section VII concludes by discussing the welfare implications. 
II.  Background 
A. Facts 
Infertility is defined as the inability to conceive after a year of unprotected intercourse.  
According to the CDC, 7.4 percent of married women, or 2.1 million women, were infertile in 
the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (Chandra et al., 2005).  Modern medicine provides 
many diagnoses of and treatments for infertility.  The most expensive Artificial Reproductive 
Technology (ART) treatments are In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), and related procedures Gamete 
Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT) and Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer (ZIFT).  Infertility treatment is 
a multi-billion dollar industry with annual estimates of $1 to $4 billion depending on the sources 
(e.g. Winter, 1998; Marketdata, 2009; Saul, 2009).   
Infertility treatment is generally not covered by insurance unless firms are required to 
cover it by a state mandate.  Infertility state mandates require that firms that provide health 
insurance must provide insurance coverage for specific infertility services or providers.  Under 
ERISA, enacted in 1974, state mandates only apply to firms that purchase insurance from an 
outside provider and do not apply to firms that self-insure.  However, larger firms that self-insure 
generally provide the same mandated coverage that firms with group coverage are required to 
provide, and the trend of self-insured firms offering mandated coverage has been increasing 
since the 1980s (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1996; Acs et al., 1996; Jensen & Morrissey, 
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1999).  It is plausible that as adverse selection goes down, large firms are less likely to exclude 
these benefits.2  The Alan Guttmacher Institute (1993) finds that IVF is “routinely covered” by 
14 percent of large group plans, 16 percent of PPOs and 17 percent of POS and HMOs.  
According to King and Meyer (1997), half of all workers in Illinois were affected by the Illinois 
mandate in 1993. 
Currently twelve states have mandates requiring that infertility treatment be covered if 
coverage is offered.  Two more states require that a plan that includes infertility treatment be 
offered to firms offering insurance, but they can price those plans at any price, thus rendering the 
“mandate to offer” ineffective.  The first law mandating infertility treatment was part of HMO 
regulation in 1977 (prior to the first successful In Vitro Fertilization) and as such only applies to 
HMO plans.  The bulk of infertility mandates were passed in the late 1980s and 1990s, although 
Connecticut changed its mandate from a mandate to “offer” in its 1989 law to a mandate to 
“cover” in its 2005 law.  Some laws, particularly the ones that only pertain to HMOs, do not 
mention specific types of coverage and thus have been subject to case law about what kind of 
coverage is mandated.  I code states as having laws if they have “mandate to cover” laws.  
Results are very similar if “to offer” laws are coded as “to cover” laws. 
Other laws specifically mention that IVF, GIFT, and/or ZIFT be covered or be excluded 
from coverage.  Laws that require coverage for these more extensive ARTs should theoretically 
be more expensive to insurers and thus to employers and should have more of a potential impact 
on labor market outcomes.  For these potentially stronger laws, I code laws that require IVF as 
                                                 
2 While larger (thus more likely to self-insure) firms do in general provide more extensive across-
the-board benefits than smaller firms, and firms do not generally self-insure as the result of 
increased state mandates, there may be variation in provision of specific mandated benefits.  The 
issue of spillover effects of mandates to (generally larger) self-insured firms is an important one 
that deserves further study. 
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having an IVF mandate.  There is some ambiguity as to whether the HMO-specific laws require 
IVF.  These laws are coded as not having coverage for IVF based on commentary by the special 
interest groups Resolve and the International Council on Infertility Information Dissemination 
(INCIID).  Coding Ohio as mandating IVF prior to 1997, as in Bitler and Schmidt (2010) and 
Schmidt (2007), the year the Superintendent of Insurance stated that IVF was not mandated, 
produces very similar results.3   
Infertility treatment mandates are correlated with increased treatment use after the 
mandate in states with those mandates (Bartels, 1993; Collins et al., 1995; Neumann, 1997).  
Prospective patients have more access to centers in states with mandates (Nangia, Likosky, & 
Wang, 2010) and clinics in mandate states are larger than in non-mandate states (Hamilton & 
McManus, 2007).  The mandates have also been shown to increase fertility, especially among 
those likely to have been affected (Bundorf, Henne, & Baker, 2007; Bitler, 2008; Jain, Harlow, 
& Hornstein, 2002; Schmidt, 2007).  More information on possible first stage effects is discussed 
in section IV.B.   
B. Cost 
Infertility treatment, or Artificial Reproductive Technology (ART), is expensive, ranging 
from a few hundred dollars for one use of ovarian stimulatory drugs such as Clomid to around 
                                                 
3 Coding Ohio as mandating IVF when it dropped a $2000 monetary cap on spending in 2000 
also slightly attenuates the magnitude of the results but does not change the results overall.  
Although New York’s law was put into place in 1990, it was clarified in 2002 (some argue it was 
strengthened, others argue it was weakened); coding New York has having the law in 2002 rather 
than 1990 attenuates results, although they are still qualitatively similar and significant.  New 
York also offers a small fund for IVF although it does not mandate IVF, an act which should not 
change how employers view the cost of potential employees unless their main concern is 
maternity leave; coding New York as offering IVF increases the magnitude of the IVF results, 
but they are still qualitatively similar to the main results for IVF.  The websites 
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/, http://www.asrm.org/, and http://www.inciid.org/ provide more 
discussion on these legal details.  There may also be spillover effects from those who work in a 
state different than their state of residence; these concerns should attenuate the magnitude of the 
results found.   
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$10,000 for a single use of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) (Bitler & Schmidt, 2010; Collins, 2001; 
Neumann, 1997; Neumann, Gharib, & Weinstein, 1994).  Neumann et al. (1994) cite that the 
average study estimates between 10 percent and 15 percent of initiated cycles result in at least 
one live birth, with age, male and female complications, number of cycles undergone, etc., all 
influencing the effectiveness.  More recently, Malizia et al. (2009) estimate a cumulative live 
birth rate after six IVF cycles of 51 to 72 percent, although the rate decreased to 23 to 42 percent 
for women over the age of 40.  Estimates of the cost of infertility treatment per birth range from 
$38,000 to $800,000 depending on assumptions about which couples select into using IVF and 
whether or not the increased incidence and cost of multiple births are taken into account in the 
calculation (Bitler & Schmidt, 2010; Collins, 2001; Neumann, 1997; Neumann, Gharib, & 
Weinstein, 1994; Reynolds et al., 2003).  Because of its expense, some countries outside of the 
US have targeted ART; Ontario, Canada specifically removed IVF from its insurance system and 
New Zealand has much higher cost sharing charges for ART than for other health care services 
(Devlin & Parkin, 2003; Giacomini, Hurley, & Stoodart, 2000).4 
An additional cost of infertility mandates is that of increased usage from moral hazard.  
The elasticity of demand for infertility treatment is much higher than that for maternity 
treatment.5  Henne and Bundorf (2008) show that poor-prognosis patients move to IVF when 
                                                 
4 Garceau et al. (2002) provides a meta review of costs of ART.  In one case study, Rabin et al. 
(1996), a model of a Washington hospital HMO is unable to offset increased break-even 
capitation rates from an increase in treatment utilization. 
5 Estimates of the elasticity of demand for maternity services are difficult to find.  The majority 
of pregnant women in the United States do give birth in the hospital (MacDorman, Menacker, & 
Declercq, 2010).  Not conditioning on pregnancy, mixed results are found on the effect of 
Medicaid expansions during the 1980s and 1990s on childbirth itself.  Earlier studies find mixed 
results—Joyce, Kaestner and Kwan (1998) suggest a 5 percent increase overall in the fertility of 
white women but not black women, Bitler and Zavodny (2010) find that a 10 percent increase in 
the eligibility cutoff increases fertility by 1.4 percent for non-blacks and 1 percent for blacks, but 
a more recent study by DeLeire, Lopoo, and Simon (2011) finds no effect of the Medicaid 
expansion on fertility. 
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they are in states with generous mandates and cross country comparisons of infertility suggest a 
utilization rate that is 277 percent higher than the rate in the absence of coverage (Jain, 2006).  
Collins (2001) estimates a median price elasticity of demand such that a 10 percent reduction in 
price is associated with a 30 percent increase in cost, and in earlier work, Collins et al. (1995) 
estimates the elasticity of demand to be between -2.2 and -4.3.  These numbers are large 
compared to the average elasticity of demand for medical services of -0.1 to -0.2 calculated 
found in the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al., 1987).  Actuarial studies on 
these mandates fail to take into account the elasticity of demand for infertility services, greatly 
underestimating the potential cost of the mandates. 
Multiple births and other complications are an additional cost to fertility coverage (GAO, 
1996).  Theoretically, fertility coverage may increase the number of multiple births on the 
extensive margin while decreasing them on the intensive margin.  That is, the number of women 
having multiple births can increase or decrease depending on changes in take-up, but conditional 
on using IVF, multiple births should decrease as doctors implant fewer embryos per cycle.  
Empirically, on the extensive margin, Bitler (2008) finds that mandates increase twinning for 
older mothers 10 to 23 percent and increase negative infant health outcomes.   Bundorf, Henne 
and Baker (2007) also find an increase in the probability of multiple births in states with 
mandates, as does Buckles (2009).  However, on the intensive margin, a number of papers using 
different empirical strategies in different universes find a decrease in embryos transferred per 
IVF cycle and a decrease in multiple births per IVF cycle in states and countries that required 
coverage (Martin et al., 2010; Henne & Bundorf, 2008; Hamilton & McManus, 2007; Katz, 
Nachtigall, & Showstack, 2002; Reynolds, Schieve, Jeng, & Peterson, 2003; Jain, Harlow, & 
Hornstein, 2002).   The strength of the intensive vs. extensive margin may vary depending on the 
structure of the benefits package offered. 
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Infertility treatment further increases costs by allowing at-risk women to give birth.  For 
example, the cost per delivery is 3.6 times higher for women over the age of 38 (Devlin & 
Parkin, 2003).  IVF conceived babies may also have higher neonatal intensive care usage, 
particularly if there is an increased chance of multiples (Devlin & Parkin, 2003; Goldfarb et al., 
1996).  Chambers et al. (2009) note that the increased cost of perinatal care from multiples is 
larger than the direct cost from the ART itself.  Aggregate cost estimates of the mandates 
themselves on medical expenditures and premiums are discussed with the first stage in 
section IV.B. 
C.  Political Economy 
States do not appear to pass infertility mandates in a manner correlated with prior fertility 
trends, nor does it appear that more wealthy states are likely to pass mandates first.  In fact, 
infertility mandate passage seems to differ from the general pattern of state innovation as 
described by Walker (1969).  These laws appear to have formed from two separate processes, 
HMO reform following West Virginia’s 1977 law, and mandates specifically directed at 
provision of fertility services.  Three states passed fertility laws within laws for HMO regulation.  
Specifically, these laws require coverage of “basic health care services … including … infertility 
services” within HMO plans (W. Va. Code §33-25A-2). 
For the laws directly targeting infertility treatment, evidence on the political economy of 
the laws points to the infertility special interest group, Resolve, as instrumental in getting 
legislation passed in several states.  In their case study of Illinois, King and Meyer (1997) 
describe Resolve’s use of political tactics such as delaying opposed members from entering 
chambers in time to vote in order to get legislation passed.  Neumann (1997) discusses the 
framework of debate about mandating IVF coverage. He suggests that supporters argue that 
infertility is a disease and it is unfair for only the wealthy to be able to treat it, while opponents 
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argue that it is expensive, encourages irrational behavior (gambling), substitutes for adoption, or 
is immoral for religious reasons.  Retsinas (1991) argues that infertile couples under the aegis of 
Resolve are pro-mandate and insurance companies are con-mandate.  She describes the battle 
over state legislatures as one of “family values” and highly available stories against insurance 
lobbying.  Fertility clinics are also pro-, but as of 1991 were not organized into any lobbying 
efforts. 
      Estimates of who uses infertility treatment vary based on insurance coverage and the 
definition of infertility treatment.  Staniec and Webb (2007) find that 76 percent of infertile 
couples seeking treatment had insurance that covered “help getting pregnant.”  However, this 
help may not include the more expensive (or effective) types of infertility treatment.  Stephen 
and Chandra (2000) do not control for mandates and find that 42 percent of the 6.7 million 
women with fertility problems in 1995 used some form of infertility services, though these 
services include advice, diagnostics, and miscarriage prevention; only 35 percent used drugs to 
induce ovulation.  Those who were most likely to use these services were older, had ever been 
married, were college graduates, had a high income, and were non-Hispanic whites, although 
differences in age, race, and ethnicity disappear when marital status, income, and private health 
insurance coverage are controlled for.  In general, the literature has found increases in overall use 
once mandates have been implemented, and this justification of the first stage will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
III. Theory 
As noted in the introduction, empirical studies of mandates on premium costs and 
employment outcomes have provided mixed results (Monheit & Rizzo, 2007 provide an 
excellent review of the literature and note that, “Studies of the impact of mandates on premiums 
provide a mixed and incomplete picture”).  However, these mixed results are exactly what is 
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predicted by economic theory, as identified by Summers (1989).  Different mandates will have 
different effects depending on the characteristics of those mandates.  This section will briefly 
discuss the general theory of insurance mandates, then will show that moral hazard can lead to a 
group not valuing a mandate at cost, and finally will demonstrate that labor market outcomes for 
a group-specific mandate will be determined by whether or not the specific group values that 
mandate at cost. 
A. Economics of Mandated Benefits 
The theory for how different mandates should work is illustrated in the flowchart in 
Figure 1.  The ideal mandate solves a market failure problem generally caused by adverse 
selection and makes all parties better off.6  Assuming that a mandate (ideal or otherwise) solves 
an adverse selection problem, the mandate will still have different possible effects based on other 
characteristics.  If a mandate has very little cost to the insurance company (for example, the use 
of midwives or cleft palate repair), then the mandate should have little to no effect on premiums 
or on employment outcomes.  When a mandate does have cost to the insurance company, then it 
is important to know whether or not the workers are able to adjust their wages to accommodate 
the increase in compensation or are unable to, as with the case of minimum wage or scale work.  
If workers are unable to adjust wages, then there are two possible outcomes.  If the mandate 
affects an identifiable group (assuming substitutes for that group exist), then the mandate will 
theoretically lead to decreased employment for that group because employers will substitute 
                                                 
6 There may also be public goods or paternalistic reasons to have a mandate, as in the case of 
vaccines or infant industries.  However, in these cases a mandate may not provide the most 
efficient solution to the market failure problem; general revenue taxes may produce smaller 
deadweight loss.  This section only considers mandates that counter an adverse selection 
problem.  Note that if the mandate has positive spillover effects to other health costs, it is likely 
that the insurance company will already cover the treatment or provider. 
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towards less expensive workers.  If there is not an identifiable group, then the company will not 
be able to avoid the cost of the mandate and profits will drop.   
Even the assumption that wages can adjust to accommodate increased mandate costs does 
not directly mean that wages will adjust.  Again, the theory depends on different aspects of the 
mandate and workers.  If the firm cannot differentiate between groups likely to be affected by the 
mandate, then outcomes will vary by whether or not the workers value the mandate at cost.  If 
workers value the mandate at cost, then wages will adjust (though perhaps not fully depending 
on individual valuation), and profits will decrease to the extent that mandates are not fully valued 
by individuals.  If workers do not value the mandate, then profits will fall. 
A final situation is one in which the mandate creates a cost for insurance companies, 
employees are not at the minimum wage, and there is an identifiable group, that is, it is a group-
specific mandate.  If the members of the group value the mandate at cost, then their wages will 
adjust and employment will not be affected.  The canonical example of this type of mandate is a 
maternity mandate (Gruber, 1994).  However, if members of the group do not fully value the 
mandate at cost, then wage decreases will not fully offset the increased cost to the employer, and 
the employer will substitute towards less expensive workers.  That outcome is the example 
provided in this paper, the effect of infertility mandates. 
B. Moral hazard can lead to a group not valuing the mandate at cost. 
Assume that the utility of success from a fertility procedure is normalized to 1 and the 
utility from failure is 0.  The simplest model is a one period model where only one treatment can 
be attempted in that period.  More complicated models allow multiple periods with an attempt in 
each period, and allow for Bayesian updating of the probability of infertility and the probability 
of success with each try of the method.  In this model, the probability of success is given.  
For either procedure: 
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E[value of procedure] = Pinfertility* (Psuccess*U(success) + Pfailure* U(failure) – Cost) 
Then E[value of procedure] = Pinfertility* (Psuccess – Cost) 
Let there be two types of procedures, the High Cost Treatment (HCT), and the Low Cost 
Treatment (LCT).  CostHCT>CostLCT. 
In the absence of insurance (NI), an infertile woman will choose the low cost treatment if: 
PLCT, success- CostLCT, NI> PHCT, success- CostHCT, NI 
This simple model assumes that the cost to the user is the same for either treatment once 
insurance has been offered.  This assumption would be directly comparable to a set co-pay per 
office visit and procedure (such as that for many insurance plans in Massachusetts), but is not 
unreasonable given the high cost of any fertility treatment compared to deductibles on plans with 
co-insurance.  A more complicated model would allow a smaller difference between the costs of 
two treatments with insurance than without. 
Thus:     CostLCT, Ins = CostHCT, Ins 
In this case, a woman will choose whichever treatment provides max(PLCT, success, PHCT, success).   
Case 1:  If PLCT, success> PHCT, success, the woman will choose the low cost treatment in both 
cases and will never use the high cost treatment.  The insurance will set the price to that of 
the low cost treatment and there will be no moral hazard. 
Case 2:  Assume then that PHCT, success> PLCT, success.  If PHCT, success- CostHCT, NI> PLCT, success- 
CostLCT, NI, then the woman will choose the high cost treatment in both cases and never use 
the low cost treatment.  The insurance company will set the price to that of the high cost 
treatment and there will be no moral hazard. 
Case 3: Assume PHCT, success> PLCT, success, and PLCT, success- CostLCT, NI> PHCT, success- CostHCT, NI, 
then the woman would have chosen the low cost treatment in the absence of health insurance.  
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The woman then will choose the higher cost treatment when insured and the lower cost 
treatment when not insured.  She has the following expected values: 
E[value | no insurance] = Pinf* (PLCT, success – CostLCT, NI) 
E[value | insurance] = Pinf* (PHCT, success – CostHC, Ins) 
In case 3, the insurance company has no choice but to set the cost of insurance at the 
expected value of the higher cost procedure.  Therefore:  
Price of infertility insurance = Pinf*( PHCT, success – CostHCT, NI). 
The woman, however, only values this treatment at the price = Pinf* (PLCT, success – CostLCT, NI) 
Thus, moral hazard causes women not to value the infertility mandate at cost.   
 When a mandate is not valued at cost, employees will be unwilling to take a pay-cut 
equivalent to the cost of the mandate.  In the next part, the effect on employment is shown for the 
simplest example, assuming that labor supply is positively sloped and own elasticity of demand 
is greater than cross-elasticity of demand.7 
C. The effect of employee value of a group-specific mandate on labor market outcomes 
Figure 2 illustrates the potential effects of a group-specific mandate on the group directly 
affected, group A, and on employment by other workers in the firm, group B.  Panel I 
demonstrates the effect on employment of both groups when group A values the mandate at cost.  
In this example, the demand curve for A shifts down as these workers become more expensive 
and the supply shifts out as these workers are attracted by the benefit.  These effects balance each 
other out such that the number of group A workers is unchanged, but the wage of workers 
decreases by the amount of the benefit.  Because employment of workers in group A is 
unchanged, there will be no effect on the employment outcomes of workers in group B. 
                                                 
7 More complicated models including welfare implications and comparisons to optimal taxation 
are available in Gruber (1992) and Hamermesh (1986). 
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Panel II illustrates the effect on employment of groups A and B when group A only 
values the mandate at a fraction of the cost, αC.  In this example, the demand curve for A shifts 
down as before.  However, the supply curve does not shift out the same amount as it did when 
group A valued the mandate fully.  Thus wages do not fully decrease to offset the cost of the 
mandate, and employment for group A decreases.  Workers in group A are not willing to pay for 
the full cost of the mandate in terms of lower wages.  Because employment of group A has 
changed, the firm has an incentive to substitute with workers from group B.  If A and B are 
perfect substitutes, the labor demand curve of group B will shift to the right and the labor supply 
and wages for group B will both increase.  If A and B are perfect complements, the labor demand 
curve will shift left, decreasing both labor supply and wages for group B.  If A and B have no 
cross elasticity of demand, then the labor demand curve for B will be unchanged and there will 
be no effect on employment outcomes of workers in B. 
IV.  Data and Identification Strategy 
A. Data 
This paper uses data from the Census Bureau’s March Current Population Survey (CPS) 
for the years 1980-2007 as a repeated cross section.  The CPS provides consistent annual 
information on employment and demographic controls throughout this time period.  Because of 
possible differences in treatment across different racial groups, the main results are restricted to 
the largest racial group, whites (Bitler & Schmidt, 2006).8  The main regressions are also 
restricted to the universe of people between the standard working ages of 25 and 64.   
                                                 
8 Although fertility problems are more common among nonwhite women than among white 
women (Bitler & Schmidt, 2010), Schmidt (2007) finds no significant effect of the mandates on 
first births for black women and Bitler and Schmidt (2010) finds that mandates did not expand 
access to treatment for nonwhites. 
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The CPS provides information to study the effects on not working, weeks worked, and 
wage outcomes.  Weeks worked and wage outcomes are reported for the previous year only.  
Wages must be imputed from total wages in the previous year, weeks worked in the previous 
year, and hours worked in the previous year.  The measure of hourly wages in the survey year for 
workers paid by the hour is not available for the entire sample and is not used.  To mitigate 
differences in coding across years and measurement error resulting in extreme outliers, wage 
data are trimmed 1 percent at the top and bottom of the wage distribution in the wage 
regressions.9 
Laws were compiled in two ways.  First, all previous compilations of infertility laws from 
previous papers examining the effect of infertility laws on fertility and access as well as the 
Resolve website were collected (Bitler & Schmidt, 2006, 2010; Bundorf, Henne, & Baker, 2007; 
Buckles, 2007; Hamilton & McManus, 2007; Jain, Harlow, & Hornstein, 2002; Schmidt, 2007). 
Second, the original law and any law changes were compiled from Westlaw and from superseded 
state statutes from the Harvard law library.  Legal interpretation from Westlaw and selected 
websites informed decisions on coding when the law was vague on the subject of coverage as 
discussed in footnote 3.  
There are several ways to code the presence of infertility laws.  The first approach would 
be to code all states that require infertility coverage of any kind as having a law.  Mandates that 
require that insurance for infertility treatment be offered but not covered are theoretically 
unlikely to have an effect as insurance companies can price the offer with infertility coverage out 
of the market, and these laws have not been found to have an effect on coverage or treatment 
                                                 
9 Results are nearly identical with larger top and bottom cuts, e.g. 2%, 5%, 10%, 20%. 
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(Bundorf, Henne, & Baker, 2007; Hamilton & McManus, 2007).10  Laws that require or do not 
exclude the most expensive form of treatment, IVF (or similar procedures of GIFT or ZIFT), are 
likely to have a stronger effect than laws that specifically exclude this procedure.  Thus, IVF 
coverage could be considered separately, or in more complicated specifications could be 
considered a “strong law.”  Three states receive their infertility coverage through regulation of 
the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) market and these infertility mandates only apply to 
HMO plans.11  Although these laws are vague about what specific infertility treatments must be 
covered, in practice they have severely limited the amount of coverage mandated. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for those in states with mandate laws and those in 
states without mandates.  Those in states with mandate laws are approximately the same age and 
gender composition, slightly less likely to be married, and somewhat more educated.  Labor 
market outcomes are also very similar.  The average year for law implementation is 1991 and 
year of passage ranges from 1977 with West Virginia to 2005 with Connecticut. 
B. First stage 
In order for infertility mandates to have an effect on employment outcomes, it must be 
empirically true that these mandates increase actual or perceived costs for these workers.  For 
costs to increase or to be perceived to increase, it must first be true that mandates increase usage 
of infertility services.  For usage to increase, access must first increase.  Previous literature has 
thoroughly explored the first stage effects of the mandates and is detailed below. 
                                                 
10 Coding “offer” laws as having the same effect as “cover” laws provides similar results to the 
main specification in Table 2, with a slightly larger coefficient of -1.321 (0.334) weeks worked.  
This increase in magnitude seems to be driven by the state of California—there is no difference 
in magnitude when coding just TX and CT (prior to 2005) as “cover” states. 
11 Removing these HMO only states from the regression provides very similar results to those in 
Table 2.  Coding HMO only states as not having a law provides nearly identical results to those 
in Table 2. 
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Access to fertility treatment is correlated with mandates.  Nangia, Likosky, and Wang 
(2010) find that the median population within 60 minutes of an Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) center was higher in states with mandates than in those without.  More cycles 
are attempted and there is higher per-capita utilization of IVF in states and countries that cover 
IVF than in those that do not (Bartels, 1993; Collins et al., 1995; Neumann, 1997).  Controlled 
studies also find a link between mandates and treatment use.  In mandate states, highly educated 
older women, of whom only 10% sought help prior to the mandate, had a 4.1 percentage point 
increase in the probability of ever having had sought medical help to get pregnant (Bitler & 
Schmidt, 2010).  Hamilton and McManus (2007) found that the number of IVF cycles increased 
by 89 percent for women under age 35 and by 91 percent for women over age 35 with the 
introduction of a mandate.  Several controlled studies find that mandates increase fertility among 
groups most likely to be affected by them (Bundorf, Henne, & Baker, 2007; Jain, Harlow, & 
Hornstein, 2002; Schmidt, 2007). 
In general, infertility mandates are perceived to be among the most expensive mandates 
offered.12  The Council for Affordable Health Insurance suggests a 3-5 percent increase in costs 
from these mandates.  Collins et al. (1995) have estimates of an annual increase of $15.69 per 
employee assuming a 500 percent increase in usage.  Even actuarial studies that do not take into 
account moral hazard concerns find increases in costs.  For example, Goodman and Matthews 
(1997) report that a Milliman and Roberts actuarial study estimates a premium increase of $105 
to $175 per family policy per year.     
Note that many estimates underestimate the potential costs of a woman in the treatment 
group.  These costs per employee are measured across all employees, not just those likely to 
utilize the mandate, and thus underestimate the cost of employees most likely to use the mandate.  
                                                 
12 See Frankfurter (2003) for further literature review of cost estimates.   
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Moreover, even small per-employee costs can lead to large costs across the entire firm.  
Additionally, as summarized in Section II.B, most estimates do not include moral hazard or the 
high elasticity of demand for these services (Collins, 1995, 2001; Jain, 2006).  Nor do they 
generally account for spillover costs to other medical expenditures, such as maternity or neonatal 
care (GAO, 1996; Goldfarb et al., 1996; Devlin & Parklin, 2003).  Indirect costs may also 
increase as controlled papers have found an increase in more costly multiple births with the 
introduction of mandates (Bundorf, Henne, & Baker, 2007; Bitler, 2008).   
C. Reduced form 
The reduced form equation is a triple difference strategy comparing women likely to have 
been affected by the law in states and years where the law was in place to the control groups of 
unmarried men, women not in the age groups, and states in years when the law is not in effect.  
The DDD equation is given by: 
+agegrouphavelawβ+femalehavelawβ+femaleagegrouphavelawβ=Y ististiistit ∗∗∗∗ 321
(1)  sti havelawβ+agegroupfemaleβ 54 ∗ + iststtsaii ε+ζ+θ+σ+δ+βX+femaleβ 76  
 
where Yit is an outcome variable including Weeks Worked, whether or not a person is in the 
labor force, or a measure of wage income.  The dichotomous variable havelawst is 1 in states s 
years t when there is a law mandating that infertility treatment be covered and 0 when there is 
not.  Similarly, femalei takes the value of 1 when the individual is female and 0 when male, and 
agegroup is 1 when the individual is in the age group likely to be affected by the law and 0 when 
not.  Controls X include dummies for education and marital status.  A full set of age fixed effects 
δa, state fixed effects σs, and year fixed effects θt are included in order to control for observable 
heterogeneity between treatment and control groups.  In some regressions a state specific time 
trend ζst is included to control for state specific differences that trend over time.   εist is an error 
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term.  Regressions are also robust to the inclusion of interacted state*year*age fixed effects in 
place of a state-specific time trend. 
 In the main specification, the choice of treatment group is women age 28-42 in states and 
years with mandates.  These ages were chosen because women’s fertility begins to decline in 
their late 20s (cf. Dunson, Colombo, & Baird, 2002) and egg quality deteriorates enough at age 
42 for many fertility clinics to restrict transfers at those ages.  Note that the treatment group in 
these employment based regressions is different than that of regressions examining fertility 
outcomes.  First, all women of later child-bearing age are potentially affected by the treatment; 
these results provide the general equilibrium results of the effect on employment for women in 
this age group, thus providing information on the labor market efficiency of these mandates.  
Second, unlike the case of fertility outcomes, it is not appropriate to limit the treatment group to 
people who are employed in jobs that provide health insurance when the outcome being 
measured is employment.  Unmarried men have been placed in the control group because they 
are not as likely to be affected by the law from an employer standpoint.  Married men are 
omitted from the universe as they are less likely than women in the treatment to be treated 
directly, but they may be indirectly treated because they may provide coverage to their wives.  
Empirical and theoretical justification of this choice is discussed in VI. A, Robustness Checks. 13 
V.  Results:  The Labor Market Impact of the State Laws 
A. Regression Framework 
 Table 2 presents the main results.  Women likely to be affected by the mandate, those 
between the ages of 28 and 42, work 1.07 fewer weeks per year than other working age people in 
the universe, which is 3 percent lower than the average number of weeks worked for all people 
                                                 
13 Specification checks with different age ranges provide very similar results.  Back of the 
envelope calculations getting a bound on the effect for women most likely to be offered 
infertility treatment are discussed in the discussion section. 
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(except married men) of 34.64 weeks.  These women are also 0.02 points more likely to be out of 
the labor force off of a base of 0.28 for the average person in the sample, an increase of 7 
percent.   
 Logged hourly wages conditional on working, shown in Table 2 columns (5) and (6), are 
not significantly affected by the mandates.  As a caution, hourly wages were calculated by 
inflating the annual wage from the previous year by the CPI calculator provided by the BLS, 
dividing that by the actual weeks worked in the previous year, and dividing that measure by the 
usual number of hours worked per week.  As with all wage results using this imputed variable, 
there will be measurement error attenuating the results.  Additionally for these regressions, the 
universe of wages has been cut off at the 1 percent level at both top and bottom to adjust for 
differences in top coding and other outliers over time.  Different methods of adjusting for these 
topcodes and outliers produce very similar results. 
B. Distributional differences   
 In general, more educated women are most likely to use infertility treatment.  Therefore 
we might expect to see differences in employment outcomes based on education level.  It appears 
that women with the lowest amounts of education, those who are not high school graduates, are 
unlikely to be affected by the mandates (Bitler & Schmidt, 2006).  Among the universe of those 
without a high school degree, the treated population works a statistically insignificant 0.464 
fewer weeks per year (se(0.644)).  However, conditioning on the woman being a high school 
graduate, there does not seem to be an increasing effect of having a law on employment 
outcomes with education.   
 Table 3 presents results on distributional differences and robustness checks.  Results may 
be stronger using states with stronger laws as the treatment states.  However, Table 3 column (1) 
shows the effect of using laws that require that IVF to be covered for the havelaw variable (states 
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with laws that exclude IVF are in the control), and the magnitude of the effect decreases to 0.931 
fewer weeks per year, suggesting that the effect is not stronger in IVF states; that is, employers 
do not differentiate between states that offer full infertility coverage and states that offer some 
infertility coverage.14  Similarly, in states where infertility coverage is only required for HMOs, 
the laws may have less of an effect. Indeed, the results when removing states that require 
coverage for HMO plans from the universe in Table 3 column (2) do show a larger magnitude, 
with treated women working 1.385 fewer weeks per year.  It may also take time for these laws to 
have an effect on employers or on the labor force composition.  Therefore, columns (3) and (4) 
test to see if the effect is stronger by lagging the law one or two years.  The coefficient from the 
one year lag is smaller than that of the regression with no lag, and the coefficient is somewhat 
smaller when 2 years of lag time is introduced, suggesting that the effect from the mandate 
begins within the first year of the law. 
C.  Potential Pathways 
 The decrease in weeks worked could be coming from changes in job accession patterns, 
changes in job separation patterns, or a movement from full-time work to part-time work or 
leaving employment.  To explore the impact of hiring and job separation outcomes for older 
workers, I construct measures of separations and accessions (hires) by matching CPS rotation 
groups as in Bleakley, Ferris, and Fuhrer (1999).  An accession is recorded when someone who 
was not employed in month m is employed in month m+1.  Similarly, an individual is coded as 
having experienced a separation in month m if he or she is employed in any month m and not in 
month m+1.  Neither hires nor separations include people who change jobs without leaving 
employment. 
                                                 
14 It is also possible that the smaller sample size within the treatment group instead causes the 
results to be less precise. 
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 If mandated workers are unwilling to take wage cuts, employers may shift employment for 
the mandated group by either decreasing hires of these groups or increasing job separations from 
these groups.  Because it is generally easier for employers to treat a protected group of workers 
differentially at the hiring margin than at the firing margin, it is likely that there would be a 
stronger negative impact on accessions than on separations, if there is an impact on separations.  
Table 4 explores pathways through which the treated group could be working fewer weeks per 
year.  Results from equation (1) with “Accession” or “Separation” as the Y variable are presented 
in Table 4, columns (1) and (2).  Although the magnitude of 0.0019 is small, there is significant 
evidence of a decrease in job accessions for the treated group.  The coefficient for separations is 
smaller, negative, and not significant, providing little evidence for increased separations as a 
pathway for decreased work for this group. 
 Changes in type of work are investigated by cutting the universe to only those working 
full-time in the previous year and examining the probability of them not working or working 
part-time in the survey year, again using equation (1) in a probit framework with not working or 
part-time as the Y variable (marginal effects are reported).  These regressions show a significant 
increase in not working of 0.139 percentage points and a marginally significant increase in part-
time work of 0.029 percentage points, in Table 4 columns (3) and (4) respectively.15  These 
results suggest that in addition to the shift into not working, there may also be a shift from full-
time work to part-time work among the treated who are employed full-time.  Part-time jobs are 
not required to provide health insurance even in companies that provide health insurance for full-
time workers and thus do not have to adjust wages or employment because of mandate costs. 
                                                 
15 Using a multinomial logit framework provides similar results.  When married men are added to 
the control group, the increase in non-working becomes only marginally significant and the 
increase in part-time becomes significant. 
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An additional pathway question is what ages are most affected by the law changes.  Table 4, 
Panel B provides information by 5 year age intervals on relative effects within the treatment 
group.  It appears that the treatment effect on weeks worked is concentrated on ages 28-32.  
However, a caution should be added to these results.  When married men are included in the 
control group, weeks worked decreases more as ages increase within the 28-42 range, suggesting 
greater effects of the mandate as age increases.   
VI.  Robustness Checks 
A.  Identification assumptions 
  Although mitigated by the triple difference strategy, an important concern is that states 
with mandates have different labor market trends than states without mandates for reasons 
unrelated to the mandates themselves, and would show the same differential outcomes in the 
absence of the mandate.  To check for prior trends, Table 5 presents a falsification exercise that 
adds a “fake” law variable that turns on five years prior to the law.  As would be expected in the 
absence of a pre-trend, coefficients on the fake interaction variables are close to zero and 
insignificant, while the main interaction term using the actual law remains significant for the 
weeks worked regressions and marginally significant for the NILF regressions.  These results 
lend credence to the idea that the DDD is picking up a true effect and not a trend.  The results are 
less clear for the ln(hourlywage) outcome, where it appears that an effect of the prior “fake law” 
exactly cancels out an opposite-signed trend in the actual law passage.  However, Hamilton and 
McManus (2007) do not find any correlation between mandate passage and household income in 
their first stage estimates in their work. 
 The previous first stage literature also checks for correlations between mandates and other 
outcomes that could affect first stages on fertility use or multiple births.  Bitler and Schmidt 
(2010) find no correlation with seeking help to prevent miscarriage, number of abortions, 
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number of pregnancy losses, or pregnancies at the time of or prior to the passage of the law.  In 
addition to their null finding on median household income, Hamilton and McManus (2007) find 
no difference in the characteristics of states that got mandates compared to those who never had 
mandates, including female labor force participation rates, female educational attainment or 
average family size.  They do find some correlation between having a mandate and support of 
government intervention in medical markets, as well as a few other political factors that might 
make it more likely to pass such a mandate while not affecting differential labor market or other 
outcomes. 
  It is also important to note that although the treatment may affect some members of the 
control group, the effect is differentially stronger for those in the treatment.  For example, there 
may be some effects of the treatment for women age 28-42 who live in control states but work in 
treatment states, which will lead to attenuation of the results.  Married men or women outside the 
age range may also be affected, but these effects will, on average, be smaller for these groups 
than for the treated groups, and may result in further attenuation.  Table 6 provides robustness 
checks adding married men to, and removing single women from, the regression universe.  Table 
6 Panel I provides results adding married men to the universe,16 and the results are very similar 
to the main results, with women in states with mandate laws in the treated group working 1.16 
fewer weeks per year than controls and no effect on ln(hourly wage).  Tables 3a and 3b, columns 
(5) and (6), demonstrate the results using different age groups in the treatment; the results are 
larger with a larger age group, working 1.44 fewer weeks per year, and not as strong when 
                                                 
16  While married men who cover their wives may be treated, rendering them an imperfect 
control, married men as a whole will be less treated than the women in our treatment group.  
Married men provide a better control in some respects than the other groups in our sample, but 
are not perfect.  
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focusing at those age 35-44, working .062 fewer weeks per year.17  Single women may not be as 
affected by the law, at least in the view of the employer, and Table 6 Panel II provides results 
eliminating single women entirely from the universe.  These results are somewhat larger than, 
but substantively similar to, those in the main specification, with women in the treatment group 
working 1.4 fewer weeks per year and again no significant effect on wages.  Table 6 Panel III 
adds married men and removes single women, and finds that women in the treatment group work 
1.6 fewer weeks per year than those in the control group. 
 A similar concern, illustrated in Figure 2, Panel II, is that the elasticity of substitution for 
the workers may affect the control group as well as the treatment group.  If there is no cross 
elasticity of substitution, then the control group will be unchanged by the treatment.  If the 
control group contains substitutes for the treatment group, then the coefficients will overestimate 
the direct effect of the treatment on the treated.  If the control group contains complements, then 
the coefficients in the regressions will underestimate the direct effect of the treatment on the 
treated. 
 B.  Robustness to specification 
 The main results are robust to more complicated specifications, including a full set of 
age*state*year, as shown in Table 3, column (7) and clustering at the state*year level rather than 
at the state level as shown in Table 3, column (8).  As mentioned in the previous section, results 
are robust to different age groups in the treatment.  Shortening the universe to the years when 
most, but not all, of the laws were put into effect, 1980-1991, attenuates the results, with affected 
women working 0.973 fewer weeks per year, as shown in Table 3, column (9).  This attenuation 
                                                 
17 Results are also robust to treatment age groups 25-42, 30-44 and 35-39, although significance 
decreases to the 10 percent level with some of these specifications.  Results are also robust to 
limiting the universe to ages 28-64.  When married men are included in the control group, these 
different treatments remain significant at the 5 percent level. 
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may be a result of the decreased sample and treatment sizes; however, it could be that access to 
more expensive infertility treatments may not have been as large during the early years of this 
time period. 
 There may be a concern that the reason for change in employment is because of new 
mothers leaving the labor force after pregnancy.18  Theoretically, childless women would be 
subject to employer beliefs about their likelihood of using infertility treatment, but would not be 
able to leave the labor force for maternity purposes.  Table 7 limits the entire universe to 
childless people and estimates the effect of being in the affected age group under a mandate 
against childless people unaffected by the mandate.  The results are very similar, with treated 
women working 1.2 fewer weeks per year than the control and an additional 0.02 point 
probability of not being in the labor force off of a base of 0.265, an increase of 8 percent. 
A similar concern is that time off the labor market to obtain and use fertility treatment is 
causing the decrease in time worked.  Eisenberg et al. (2010) finds that infertile women seeking 
treatment spend a median of 51.5 hours on infertility-related activities over an 18 month period.  
Using this information and information on the percentage of white women age 28-42 that use 
infertility services for 2002 calculated from the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), I am 
able to get an estimate of the average number of hours that all white women in this age group 
spend on fertility treatment.  Thus:  51.5 hours per 18 months * (12/18) * 0.166 = 5.70 hours per 
year.  Using similar estimates for 1995 data or looking at all women rather than just white 
women, these hours range from 3.81 hours per year to 6.87 hours per year.  This time spent on 
                                                 
18 For example Cristia (2008) studies women actively trying to get pregnant with their first 
children and who saw a healthcare professional for fertility reasons, and finds that labor force 
participation drops when their first children are less than one year old.  The effect measured in 
the current study is that of a stereotype on a larger group of women who may not be trying to get 
pregnant or whose decision to seek fertility treatment is more marginal.  It is important to note 
also that the effect Cristia finds is on a much smaller, more selected group, and may have a more 
elastic labor supply response to fertility. 
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fertility treatment itself would decrease the estimates of the magnitude of the results on weeks 
worked by 0.095 to 0.17 weeks per year depending on the assumptions made.  
VII.  Discussion and welfare implications. 
 Not all mandates have the same labor market effects.  This paper has shown that infertility 
mandates, group-specific mandates which are not valued at cost, decrease the labor supply of 
women most likely to be affected by these mandates.  Weeks worked per year and labor force 
attachment decrease.  This decrease is similar to that found for the decrease in weeks worked for 
men in states with stronger age discrimination laws in Lahey (2008), and smaller than that found 
by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) for the Americans with Disabilities Act.  Wages are only 
marginally affected by the addition of these laws.  Results are robust to several specification 
checks and are not driven by decreased labor force participation after childbirth. 
 The finding that firms treat more expensive workers differentially fits with previous 
findings on health insurance.  For example, Kapur, Escarce, Marquis, and Simon (2008) look at 
small firms only and find that workers with high expected health costs are less likely to be 
employed at firms with insurance compared to those without insurance, despite workers’ greater 
demand for insurance.  Similarly, Lahey (2007) finds less employment shifting for older workers 
when younger workers become relatively more expensive because of mandates. 
 The results in this paper pertain to the labor market for affected women as a whole.  
Unlike previous work on infertility mandates that examines the direct effect of insurance on 
fertility, it is not necessary or desirable to compare women directly impacted because they are 
already employed in firms that are covered by the law.  Indeed, such employment is endogenous 
to the mandate precisely because the treated group, if employed, may be forced to sort into firms 
that are not mandated to provide infertility insurance.  However, following Bitler (2008), the 
direct effect on women likely to be directly affected by these mandates can be imprecisely 
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estimated using a back-of-the-envelope calculation in which the coefficient on the interaction 
term is inflated by the share of women who are included in an employer group health insurance 
plan or an employer paid health insurance plan in a state-year cell.  Using these variables, the 
number of weeks worked decreases between 2.6 and 3 weeks per year among the treated group 
and there is no effect on wages, as might be expected.  An additional check would be to use firm 
size in these calculations, as small firms are less likely to have insurance and large firms are not 
required to carry such insurance (though there is evidence that self-insured firms do provide 
mandated coverage (e.g. GAO, 1996; Acs et al., 1996; Jensen & Morrissey, 1999).19  
Unfortunately, the variable for firm-size does not exist in the CPS until 1988, making such 
estimates unreliable for this sample.   
 Direct cost-benefit analysis is complicated when the mandate involves childbirth because 
the benefit is difficult to value.  The price of a life created may not be given the same value as 
the price of a life saved in hedonic analysis (Devlin & Parkin, 2003).  Additionally, there are 
wide-ranging direct cost estimates of infertility mandates for employers.  Note though that costs 
to the economy may actually be higher if fertility drugs lead to more complicated births, more 
premature infants, and other increased costs not generally included. 
 It is important to acknowledge that, while this paper focuses on the direct effects of a 
group-specific mandate on labor force participation and wages, increased health insurance costs 
may affect labor market outcomes in paths other than the ones explored in this paper.  For 
example, employers could shift the more expensive employees to work more hours in order to 
                                                 
19 These results provide only information on the effect of state mandates, not the effect of a 
federal mandate, which would directly affect firms that self-insure.  As such, the main results in 
the paper provide a lower bound of the effect of a federal law.  Because not all firms are covered 
by state mandates, potentially more expensive women are able to sort into firms that are not 
mandated to offer benefits, which would decrease the extent of labor market inefficiencies 
caused by the mandate.  A federal mandate would not allow that sorting. 
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decrease the average cost of the fixed benefit.  Examining the overall effects of having any 
insurance, Cutler and Madrian (1998) document that in addition to some wage shifting, insured 
workers work 3 percent longer hours when insurance costs increase over the 1980s.  Similarly, 
there may be a move towards substituting not only across groups in the case of group-specific 
mandates, but across types of workers who are covered by insurance.  Cutler and Madrian (1998) 
also discuss the mixed literature regarding the increase in part-time or temporary workers who 
are not covered by health insurance to substitute for full-time workers who are covered. 
Another method that employers could use in the face of increased mandate costs is to 
either drop insurance entirely or move to self-insurance.  Because I cannot separate between 
firms that offer insurance from those that do not for most of the years in my CPS sample, my 
results tend to underestimate the actual treatment effect as some firms in the treatment are not 
actually covered by the mandate (and indeed, may have to compensate for lower benefits through 
higher wages).  However, other literature has found very little evidence of either of these effects 
occurring.  Jensen and Gable (1992) find some evidence of shifts towards small firms dropping 
health insurance, but Gruber (1992) is able to use a somewhat cleaner identification strategy and 
better data and finds no such effects. 
In conclusion, not all mandates are created equal.  When group-specific mandates are not 
valued at cost, the group affected is unwilling to make the trade-off between wages and benefit 
provision, and thus members of that group become more expensive to employers.  While some 
mandates may increase efficient provision of services, others provide larger labor market 
inefficiencies which work against the interest of the group they are meant to benefit.  Unlike 
maternity mandates, infertility mandates belong to this latter set.  If society values access to 
infertility treatment, then publicly provided benefits would not provide the same group-specific 
labor market distortions that mandates do, although publicly provided benefits present their own 
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dead-weight losses from tax-financed provision (Summers, 1989).  The mixed findings on the 
effects of insurance mandates are not a mystery, but are exactly what is predicted by theory.  
Policy makers should examine each mandate individually based on its own merits rather than 
categorizing them as the same.   
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Figure 1:  Theoretical Effects of Mandated Benefits Flowchart 
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Figure 2:  Effect of Mandate Valuation on Labor Supply 
Panel I:  A values benefit fully, B is not directly affected by benefit 
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Figure 3 
Years of Law Implementation 
State Year Cover Offer IVF HMO 
      
Arkansas 1987 X  Only  
California 1989  X No, GIFT  
Connecticut 1989  X Yes  
Connecticut 2005 X  Yes  
Hawaii 1987 X  Only  
Illinois 1991 X  Yes  
Maryland 1985 X  Only  
Massachusetts 1987 X  Yes  
Montana 1987 X   Only 
New Jersey 2001 X  Yes  
New York 1990 X  No  
Ohio 1991 X   Only 
Rhode Island 1989 X  Yes  
Texas 1987  X Only  
West Virginia 1977 X     Only 
NOTE--The table reports the type of mandate each state enacted and its 
provisions.  In the IVF column, “yes” indicates access to comprehensive IVF 
treatments, such as GIFT and ZIFT, while “only” specifies that the mandate 
only covers/offers limited IVF treatment.  New York is coded as “no” in the 
IVF column because while it is coded as a mandate state, it does not mandate 
IVF but instead has a small fund for IVF.  In the HMO column, state 
mandates that only apply to HMO plans are coded as “only.” 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics, CPS 1980-2007 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Everybody  With Law  Without Law 
 (N=1,267,033)  (N=203,422)  (N=1,063,611) 
      
Age 41.559  42.004  41.474 
Married 0.569  0.537  0.575 
White 1.000  1.000  1.000 
Female 0.801  0.789  0.803 
      
No HS 0.149  0.121  0.155 
HS 0.378  0.363  0.381 
Some College 0.238  0.240  0.238 
College Grad 0.167  0.184  0.163 
      
weeks worked 34.638  35.495  34.474 
NILF* 0.277  0.265  0.280 
ln(hourlywage)** 1.861  1.957  1.842 
      
Year Law Passed 1991       
       
      
           
      
          
NOTE-- Universe includes all people aged 25-64 in the March CPS from 1980-2007 
except married men.  Hourly wages are adjusted using a CPI inflator where 1982-1984 
= 100.   *Uses concurrent CPS, number of observations are 1265645, 203245, 1062400.  
**Uses concurrent CPS, number of observations are 893658, 146061, 747597.   
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Table 2 
Main Results 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  Weeks Worked  NILF  ln(hourly wage) 
law*female*2842 -1.069** -1.067**   0.022** 0.022**   0.000 0.000 
 (0.371) (0.373)   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.009) (0.009) 
law*2842 0.293 0.301   -0.000 -0.000   0.004 0.003 
 (0.210) (0.206)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.007) (0.007) 
female*2842 -2.539** -2.534**   0.083** 0.083**   0.030** 0.030** 
 (0.146) (0.146)   (0.003) (0.003)   (0.005) (0.005) 
law*female 1.963** 1.964**   -0.045** -0.045**   0.045** 0.045** 
 (0.366) (0.361)   (0.007) (0.007)   (0.015) (0.015) 
female -0.991** -0.993**   0.034** 0.034**   -0.182** -0.182** 
 (0.246) (0.246)   (0.006) (0.006)   (0.009) (0.009) 
have law -0.872* -1.015*   0.022** 0.021**   -0.035* -0.019 
 (0.383) (0.388)   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.016) (0.020) 
Observations 1,266,977 1,266,977   1,265,596 1,265,596   877,441 877,441 
State Trend No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
NOTE--Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on state. The table reports interactions in 
regressions that include married, white, education dummies, age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. OLS 
results are reported in the Weeks Worked and ln(hourlywage) columns.  The marginal of the probit coefficient is 
reported in the NILF column. Weeks worked and wage information refer to the previous year. Regressions are 
weighted at the person level.  The universe was limited to whites, ages 25 to 64 for years 1980 and above.  Married 
men were also dropped from the universe.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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NOTE-- Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on state. The table reports interactions in regressions that include married, 
white, no high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies.   Ln(hourly 
wage) was adjusted  using a CPI inflator where 1982-1984 = 100.  Weeks worked last year has been lagged a year in order to align actual data 
from weeks worked last year with the year the law was enacted.  Regressions are weighted by person weight.  The universe includes whites, 
age 25 to 64 for years 1980 to 2007.  Married men have been dropped from the universe.  Column (1) reports results where IVF is the mandate 
variable instead of infertility. Column (2) reports results where states with HMO coverage only (Montana, Ohio, and West Virginia) were 
dropped from the dataset.  Column (3) and column (4) report results where the base is given 1 and 2 years leads respectively.  Column (5) and 
column (6) report results where the age group has been cut to 25-44 and 35-44.  Column (7) reports the results of regressions that included the 
age*state*year variable as an additional fixed effect.  Column (8) presents the results of regressions that were run with clustering on state and 
year. Column (9) reports regression results where the years in the universe have been cut to 1980-1991.  
Table 3 
Distributional Differences and Robustness Checks 
 A. Weeks Worked Last Year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
IVF as 
mandate 
variable 
No HMO Have Law 
One Year 
Later 
Have Law 
Two Years 
Later 
Age 
Group 
25-44 
Age Group 
35-44 
Age State 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Clustering 
on 
State*Year 
1980-
1991 
law*female*agegrp -0.931* -1.385** -0.999** -0.982** -1.441** -0.623 -1.092** -1.069** -0.973 
 (0.398) (0.345) (0.337) (0.322) (0.415) (0.450) (0.297) (0.258) (0.707) 
law*agegrp 0.260 0.282 0.248 0.337 0.481 -0.188 -0.123 0.293 0.577 
 (0.230) (0.217) (0.212) (0.229) (0.278) (0.238) (0.255) (0.216) (0.715) 
female*agegrp -2.642** -2.538** -2.559** -2.568** -3.356** 0.508** -2.531** -2.539** -1.480** 
 (0.168) (0.150) (0.147) (0.150) (0.241) (0.155) (0.151) (0.132) (0.193) 
law*female 2.258** 2.033** 2.040** 2.078** 2.308** 1.696** 2.007** 1.963** 1.391** 
 (0.462) (0.414) (0.373) (0.387) (0.421) (0.396) (0.370) (0.242) (0.456) 
female  -0.848** -0.954** -0.985** -0.973** 0.106 -2.370** -1.046** -0.991** -1.411** 
 (0.189) (0.252) (0.243) (0.238) (0.277) (0.286) (0.243) (0.104) (0.318) 
have law -1.379** -1.008* -0.866* -0.961* -1.021* -0.687 -1.845** -0.872** -0.775 
  (0.485) (0.380) (0.405) (0.435) (0.421) (0.360) (0.601) (0.226) (0.597) 
Observations 1,266,977 1,185,816 1,266,977 1,266,977 1,266,977 1,266,977 1,266,977 1,266,977 525,221 
  B. Ln(Hourly Wage) 
law*female*agegrp 0.016* 0.006 0.002 0.005 -0.012 0.010 0.001 0.000 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) 
law*agegrp 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.009 -0.006 0.002 0.004 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.022) 
female*agegrp 0.029** 0.029** 0.030** 0.030** 0.068** -0.025** 0.029** 0.030** 0.048** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
law*female 0.042** 0.054** 0.047** 0.047** 0.055* 0.042** 0.041* 0.045** 0.057 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016) (0.008) (0.033) 
female  -0.178** -0.180** -0.182** -0.182** -0.217** -0.160** -0.181** -0.182** -0.228** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
have law -0.025 -0.041* -0.034* -0.037* -0.040* -0.031* 0.014 -0.035** -0.012 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.009) (0.038) 
Observations 877,441 823248 877,441 877,441 877,441 877,441 877,441 877,441 346,623 
Age*State*Year 
Fixed Effects No No No No No No Yes No No 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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 Table 4 
Pathways 
 A. Labor Market Transitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Accession Separation Fulltime to NW Fulltime to PT 
law*female*2842 -0.0019** -0.0002 0.139** 0.029 
 (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.051) (0.020) 
law*2842 0.0010 0.0000 -0.107** -0.027* 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.039) (0.014) 
female*2842 0.0023** 0.0006 -0.069* -0.046** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.029) (0.009) 
law*female 0.0005 -0.0017* -0.086 -0.021 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.047) (0.011) 
female  -0.0039** -0.0046** -0.094** 0.006 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.024) (0.006) 
have law 0.0017* 0.0028** 0.104** 0.026* 
 (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.035) (0.010) 
Observations 9,148,491 9,252,568 17,267 120,658 
 B. Five Year Age Intervals 
  Weeks Worked ln(hourly wage) 
law*female*2832 -1.522** -1.524** -0.019 -0.020 
 (0.319) (0.318) (0.012) (0.012) 
law*female*3337 -0.897 -0.896 0.013 0.013 
 (0.636) (0.636) (0.010) (0.010) 
law*female*3842 -0.800 -0.793 0.017 0.017 
 (0.493) (0.501) (0.017) (0.017) 
Observations 1266977 1266977 877441 877441 
State Trend No Yes No Yes 
NOTE--Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on state.   Married men were 
dropped from the universe.  Both panels report interactions in regressions that control for married, 
white, and education.  The regressions were also run with a full set of age dummies, state dummies, 
and year dummies.   OLS results are reported throughout the table.  Regressions are weighted by 
person weight.  The universe includes whites, age 25 to 64 for years 1980 to 2007.  In Panel A, 
column (1) an accession is recorded when someone who was not employed in month m is employed 
in month m+1.  In column (2), an individual is coded as having experienced a separation in month m 
if he or she is employed in any month m and not in month m+1.  Column (3) reports results for 
individuals transitioning from fulltime to not working.  Column (4) reports results on individuals 
transitioning from fulltime to part-time.  Fulltime in the previous year is defined as working 35 
hours or more and at least 40 weeks that year.  Part-time is defined as working less than 35 hours.  
Not working is defined by workers who are either not in the labor force or are unemployed.   Panel 
B presents the results of triple interactions, which have age intervals of five years, for weeks worked 
and ln(hourly wage).  There were also main effects for law*2832, law*3337, law*3842, 
female*2832, female*3337, female*3842, law*female, female, and have law.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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 Table 5 
Robustness Check Regressions 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
  Weeks Worked  NILF   ln(hourly wage) 
law*female*2842 -1.233** -1.230**  0.018 0.018  -0.042** -0.041** 
 (0.440) (0.440)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.015) 
fakelaw*female*2842 0.164 0.163  0.005 0.005  0.047** 0.046** 
 (0.590) (0.587)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.012) (0.012) 
law*2842 1.618** 1.628**  -0.018 -0.018  0.044** 0.043** 
 (0.534) (0.530)  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.006) 
fakelaw*2842 -1.465** -1.458**  0.021 0.020  -0.045** -0.044** 
 (0.511) (0.515)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.011) (0.011) 
female*2842 -2.537** -2.531**  0.082** 0.082**  0.026** 0.026** 
 (0.152) (0.152)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
law*female 3.922** 3.917**  -0.083** -0.082**  0.095** 0.094** 
 (0.606) (0.608)  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.019) (0.019) 
fakelaw*female -2.163** -2.155**  0.048** 0.047**  -0.055** -0.055** 
 (0.647) (0.647)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.020) (0.020) 
female  -0.789** -0.792**  0.030** 0.030**  -0.177** -0.177** 
 (0.209) (0.210)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.009) -0.009 
have law -2.895** -3.207**  0.069** 0.070**  -0.077** -0.063** 
 (0.739) (0.720)  (0.017) (0.016)  (0.017) (0.011) 
fake law 1.464 1.443*  -0.034* -0.038*  0.046** 0.028 
 (0.747) (0.651)  (0.016) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.027) 
Observations 1,266,977 1,266,977  1,265,596 1,265,596  877,441 877,441 
State Trend No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
NOTE--Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on state. The table reports interactions in 
regressions that include married, white, no high school, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, age 
dummies, year dummies, and state dummies.  The table also includes fake law regressions. Fake law is defined as 5 
years prior to law passage.  OLS results are reported in the Weeks Worked and Ln(hourlywage) columns.  The 
marginal of the Probit coefficient is reported in the NILF column. Weeks worked and wage information refer to the 
previous year. Regressions are weighted by person weight.  The universe includes whites, age 25 to 64 for years 
1980 to 2007.  Married men have been dropped from the universe.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table 6 
Different Universes 
 A. With Married Men 
 Weeks Worked NILF ln(hourly wage) 
law*female*2842 -1.163** 0.007 -0.002 
 (0.342) (0.005) (0.010) 
law*2842 0.398 0.010 0.009* 
 (0.205) (0.006) (0.004) 
female*2842 -1.482** 0.088** 0.049** 
 (0.155) (0.002) (0.003) 
law*female 2.473** -0.039** 0.051** 
 (0.377) (0.005) (0.019) 
female  -9.815** 0.175** -0.355** 
 (0.258) (0.004) (0.011) 
have law -1.250** 0.019** -0.030* 
 (0.327) (0.006) (0.013) 
Observations 1979091 1967714 1455688 
 B. No Single Women 
law*female*2842 -1.402* 0.031** 0.011 
 (0.555) (0.011) (0.009) 
law*2842 0.250 0.001 0.004 
 (0.207) (0.005) (0.007) 
female*2842 -3.007** 0.095** 0.036** 
 (0.167) (0.003) (0.005) 
law*female 2.785** -0.062** 0.048** 
 (0.451) (0.009) (0.016) 
female  -6.948** 0.154** -0.190** 
 (0.335) (0.006) (0.009) 
have law -1.196** 0.030** -0.035* 
 (0.432) (0.010) (0.015) 
Observations 973,124 971,869 656,800 
 C. With Married Men and No Single Women 
law*female*2842 -1.615** 0.016* 0.006 
 (0.538) (0.006) (0.009) 
law*2842 0.458* 0.008 0.010* 
 (0.199) (0.005) (0.004) 
female*2842 -2.023** 0.107** 0.053** 
 (0.181) (0.003) (0.004) 
law*female 2.999** -0.043** 0.050** 
 (0.414) (0.006) (0.017) 
female  -13.110** 0.248** -0.429** 
 (0.312) (0.005) (0.011) 
have law -1.302** 0.018** -0.026* 
 (0.327) (0.006) (0.012) 
Observations 1685238 1673987 1,235,047 
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NOTE--Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on state. The table reports interactions in 
regressions that include married, white, education dummies, age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. 
The regressions include state trends. OLS results are reported in the Weeks Worked and Ln(hourlywage) 
columns.  The marginal of the probit coefficient is reported in the NILF column. Weeks worked and wage 
information refer to the previous year. Regressions are weighted by person weight.  The universe includes no 
married men, whites, age 25 to 64 for years 1980 to 2007.  For Panel A, married men were included in the 
universe.  In Panel B, single women were deleted from the regression universe.  For Panel C, the universe 
includes married men and no single women.    * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table 7 
Childless Women 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
  Weeks Worked  NILF   ln(hourly wage) 
law*female*2842 -1.220** -1.194**   0.022** 0.021**   -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.398) (0.402)   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.011) (0.011) 
law*2842 0.181 0.154   0.001 0.001   0.007 0.006 
 (0.253) (0.248)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.009) (0.009) 
female*2842 0.485 0.483   0.014** 0.014**   0.055** 0.055** 
 (0.250) (0.250)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.006) (0.006) 
law*female 1.592** 1.554**   -0.036** -0.035**   0.044** 0.044** 
 (0.386) (0.388)   (0.007) (0.007)   (0.016) (0.016) 
female  -0.599** -0.595**   0.028** 0.028**   -0.151** -0.151** 
 (0.215) (0.215)   (0.005) (0.005)   (0.008) -0.008 
have law -1.275** -0.711   0.026** 0.009   -0.034* -0.003 
 (0.440) (0.546)   (0.008) (0.009)   (0.015) (0.017) 
Observations 628,931 628,931   628,030 628,030   450,405 450,405 
State Trend No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
NOTE--Robust standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered on state. The table reports regressions on the 
universe of the childless only.  The table reports interactions in regressions that include married, white, education 
dummies, age dummies, year dummies, and state dummies. OLS results are reported in the Weeks Worked and  
Ln(hourlywage) columns.  The marginal of the probit coefficient is reported in the NILF column. Weeks worked 
and wage information refer to the previous year. Regressions are weighted by person weight.  The universe includes 
whites, age 25 to 64 for years 1980 to 2007.   Married men have been dropped from the universe.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
 
